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Brothers in Arms in the European Car Wars: Management-Labour
Pacts in the Context of Regime Competition
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Abstract
During the 1990s, virtually all major European car companies arrived at company-level collective
agreements on employment and competitiveness. In brief, these pacts aim at maintaining or creating jobs
and at improving the competitiveness of the plant or company in inter- as well as intracompany
competition. This paper first presents two approaches to analyse such employment pacts. It then
introduces selected cases of company-level employment pacts in the European car industry. The main part
of the paper analyses these employment pacts and discusses their implications for labour relations. The
author concludes that the employment pacts in the European car industry may not just be seen as examples
of concession bargaining, but rather as new, emerging forms of cooperative and consensual labour
relations, which are about adjusting the governance of the employment relationship to the imperatives of
joint competitive success.
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1     Introduction[1]
 
During the 1990s, company-level collective agreements on employment were successfully
negotiated at virtually all major European car companies (Hancke 1998, Zagelmeyer
forthcoming). In brief, these company-level employment pacts, or "pacts for employment
and competitiveness" (Sisson et al. 1999) aim at maintaining or creating jobs and at
improving the competitiveness of the plant or company in inter- as well as intraconcern
competition.
 
In contrast to other studies which have focussed their attention almost exclusively on
national-level tripartite or corporatist "social pacts" (see the contributions in Fajertag and
Pochet 1997, Hassel 1998), this paper follows the more recent path of research that
concentrates on company-level employment pacts (Sisson et al. 1999). It will describe,
analyse, and discuss the emergence, content, development, and implications of such
company-level employment pacts in multinational companies in the European car industry.
The European car industry has been chosen for a number of reasons: First, since the 1980s
the industry is in a process of continuous restructuring. Second, the industry consists
mainly of multinational enterprises and is subject to regime competition. Third, all major
European car companies concluded agreements that either included employment as a
bargaining issue or that had an effect on employment at the respective company or plant.
Fourth, the agreements in the car industry in a sense represent the most important
characteristics of many other company-level agreements on employment in other branches.
 
Collective bargaining on employment is understood here in the broad sense of collective
relations between management or an employers' association and employees that deal with
job reduction, maintenance, and creation, either directly or indirectly. The concept
embraces the activities of works councils as well as of trade unions. Resulting collective
agreements on employment (or employment pacts) may include clauses on withdrawal of
announced lay-offs, agreement to no compulsory redundancy, employment guarantee for
certain groups of (or all) employees and for a certain time, unlimited employment
guarantee, and additional employment for specific groups of (or all) employees.
Furthermore, the transformation of temporary into permanent jobs is also included.
 
The paper is organized as follows: First, stylized facts on and theoretical approaches to
company-level employment pacts are introduced. Second, the paper provides background
information on recent developments and perspectives in the European car industry and
describes the restructuring activities at a selected number of plants in different European
Union (EU) member countries. Most of these activities were accompanied by some form of
employment-related collective agreement. The third part of the paper analyses the
company-level employment pacts and discusses the implications for labour relations.
 
The descriptive information included in this paper is mostly based on a comprehensive
analysis of the EIROnline-database (http://www.eiro.eurofound.ie) with regard to social
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partner activities on employment (Zagelmeyer forthcoming). The articles in the EIROnline
database report on more than 30 employment-related collective agreements in the
European car industry.
 
 
2 Collective bargaining on employment
 
In order to analyse emergence, content, and impact of employment pacts at various levels,
one may choose between two, not necessarily mutually exclusive, analytical perspectives,
namely the employment policy perspective and the regime competition perspective. In the
following, recent developments concerning the levels and contents of employment pacts in
the European Union will be summarized. Then, the two analytical perspectives will be
briefly introduced.
 
 
2.1 Employment pacts: Levels and contents
 
Since the early 1990s, all EU countries have witnessed the occurrence of explicit
bargaining activities and the resulting agreements on employment and competitiveness.
These have ranged from national, sectoral or regional tripartite or bipartite "employment
alliances or pacts" to company-specific agreements between employers and works councils
or trade unions. There is a myriad of different employment pacts at different levels. Due to
the large number and complexity of such agreements, it is not possible to give a
comprehensive account of such agreements in this paper. Details on pacts that were
concluded at the different levels since the early 1990s are given in Zagelmeyer
(forthcoming). However, to get an idea of what employment pacts at all levels are about,
the following section roughly outlines objectives and contents of pacts at different
bargaining levels.
 
With regard to the contents of such agreements, activities at the national and regional
levels mostly contain a wide range of economic, industrial, social and labour market policy
measures with the explicit aim of creating new employment. Concerning the labour market,
measures aim at (1) reducing labour costs, (2) increasing the flexibility of the labour
market, and (3) improving the employability of the workforce. In contrast to the tripartite
and largely Keynesian incomes policy agreements of the postwar period, which mainly
aimed at controlling inflation, the "new form" of concertation aims at improving labour
market performance by applying supply-side-oriented measures.
 
At the sectoral level, in a number of countries, the social partners have included so-called
"opening clauses" or "hardship clauses" in collective agreements, which usually allow the
company-level actors to agree on temporary deviations from the standards of pay and
conditions agreed in industry-level bargaining in exchange for temporary job guarantees.
Other agreements include "entrance wages" for new hires and special target groups, such
as long-term unemployed people, thus establishing two-tier pay systems. Furthermore,
agreements on partial or early retirement are regarded as major contributions by the social
partners to combat unemployment.
 
At the company level, bargaining on employment has been taking place increasingly in
almost all European Union countries between management and either trade unions or
works councils. In most cases these negotiations aim to avert redundancies or guarantee
the current level of employment in situations where the company is restructuring,
investment decisions on production locations are being made, or the demand for the
company's products is falling. As regards employment, these agreements may include the
withdrawal of announced lay-offs or redundancies, no-redundancy clauses, employment
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guarantees, additional employment, and the transformation from temporary to permanent
jobs. The general pattern was that management would announce the need for restructuring,
cost reducing or productivity enhancing activities. Then employee representatives would
react, albeit in different ways, to the demands of management. In some cases,
company-level activities were the response to acute crisis situations in which companies
were at the edge of bankruptcy. In the vast majority of cases, management and the
workforce representatives negotiated employment and substantive issues together in
packages that included a kind of trade-off of job security for concessions on the
employees' side. Such concessions were mainly related to working time and compensation
and included working time flexibility, working time reduction with or without partial or full
compensation, overtime, wage freezes and reductions, changes in calculation bases for
wage increases, reduction in bonuses and "pay above contract wages", pay-for-
performance schemes, and two-tier wage systems. In addition, some agreements also
included investment commitments by management as well as additional information and
participation rights for employees. Methods to preserve employment have varied from
company to company, and, in most cases, the aims of the agreements have been achieved.
There have also been a few cases of company agreements creating employment - notably
in France, Germany, Italy, and Spain. In these very few cases, employee representatives
took the initiative to reduce the workload and overtime in exchange for the hiring of
additional employees.
 
 
2.2 The employment policy perspective
 
The rising level of unemployment in the European union has continually been
accompanied by a controversial discussion on the role of collective bargaining in
contributing to and alleviating unemployment. In general, the social partners themselves
have rather different views on how collective bargaining could help to improve the
employment situation. On the one hand, employers and their associations focus mainly on
supply-side policies, labour market flexibility and labour costs, which they consider too
high. Therefore, a moderate wage policy and deregulation of the labour market are
regarded as the best ways to create new employment. On the other hand, the trade unions
focus very much on macroeconomic demand management and the redistribution of the
available supply of work. They advocate various forms of working time reduction as a way
to better distribute existing work and, therefore, to bring about opportunities for new jobs.
 
Since the early 1990s, governments and social partners in most EU member states have
been searching for policies to remedy the situation. All EU countries have witnessed the
occurrence of explicit bargaining activities and resulting agreements on employment and
competitiveness. "Pact" is the current "buzzword" in employment initiatives.
 
The employment policy perspective regards these pacts as attempts by the labour relations
actors to maintain and create employment. It analyses the extent to which the
contemporary employment pacts represent a means to help alleviate the current European
unemployment crisis, i.e. whether or not and under what circumstances corporatist
tripartite arrangements or bipartite activities between the social partners at various levels
within a multilevel polity have positive employment effects. For a brief discussion from
this perspective see Schnabel and Zagelmeyer (2000).
 
 
2.3 The regime competition perspective
 
The regime competition perspective focusses on the ways in which systems of national
labour relations in Europe are being transformed by the impact of economic and
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institutional internationalization (Streeck 1998). Specifically, it analyses the adjustment
processes of labour relations institutions (e.g. collective bargaining) initiated by actors (i.e.
companies, trade unions, or works councils) in the increasing institutional or "regime"
competition that results from growing international economic integration.
 
This approach explicitly addresses the research issue concerning the extent to which the
employment relationship will continue to be regulated primarily within national systems of
governance, which are embedded horizontally in international market relations that lead to
various sorts of regime competition and vertically in institutional relations with
supranational political actors and administrative agencies that claim to "coordinate" them.
Also, this approach examines whether both types of embeddedness and the associated
pressures for institutional adjustment will result in the convergence of systems.
 
An especially interesting issue in this context is the role of multinational companies
(MNCs) in regime competition, since they are often in a position to make investment and
divestment decisions that exploit the different properties of national regimes of industrial
relations, meaning it is relatively easy for them to go "regime shopping", to shift production
sites to different locations. For a long time, MNCs have been recognized as key influences
on collective bargaining in Europe, especially in setting trends in management approaches
to collective bargaining and pay systems. Deepening European economic integration has
encouraged restructuring within MNCs. With regard to national industrial relations
systems, these developments associated with the restructuring of MNCs have profound
implications for national systems of collective bargaining throughout Europe. It is argued
that these developments are in effect encouraging decentralization of collective bargaining
to the single-employer level and challenging established structures of multi-employer
collective bargaining. At the same time, however, there is also pressure to establish
collective bargaining at the European level (Marginson and Schulten 1999, Marginson and
Sisson 1996, Zagelmeyer 1999).
 
Following Marginson and Sisson (1996), there are a number of reasons that may account
for management's aim to decentralize collective bargaining in MNCs. To begin with,
international competition puts pressure on management not to concede general
improvements in pay and conditions that would increase costs. Simultaneously,
national-level multi-employer collective bargaining no longer provides a basis for excluding
labour costs as a competitive factor. Also, the development of organization-based
employment systems allows management to develop working arrangements that are
tailored to their needs. Multi-employer agreements provide only a framework within which
further negotiation on changes can take place at lower levels, which among others serve
the purpose of legitimating changes amongst its own workforce. Furthermore, systems of
performance control adopted by corporate management not only compare measures of
financial and market performance, but also of labour performance. Together with a shift of
responsibility and accountability for labour as well as other costs to the business units,
information from inter-plant comparisons may be used to pressure business unit
management and to extract concessions in employment and working practices from local
workforces as the price for future investment. This mechanism to neutralize the workplace
may make multi-employer collective bargaining arrangements superfluous. Finally,
management may be more confident of its ability to reach agreements with its employees
at the local level that contribute to the plant's competitive advantage.
 
 
3 Collective bargaining on employment in the European car industry
 
After providing some background information on the European car industry, this chapter
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presents selected examples of company-level agreements on employment at European car
producers.
 
 
3.1 The European car industry: The European car wars
 
Concentration in the car industry is rather high in the European Union, as it is worldwide.
The production of the six largest European concerns, namely Volkswagen, PSA Peugeot
Citroën, Renault, Fiat, BMW/Rover and Daimler-Benz, plus that of Ford and the
subsidiaries of General Motors (Vauxhall, Opel) amounted to 90 percent of the total
European car production in 1997. Data from the European car producer association ACEA
(Association des Constructeurs Européens d'Automobiles) show that the European car
industry suffered when production dropped dramatically and sales declined in 1991 and
1993, in the latter case by two-digit rates. Again in 1996, production decreased. Especially
in association with the 1993 crisis, a number of European automobile manufacturers were
hit by remarkable losses. Employment in the European automotive industry decreased
from 2 million in 1990 to 1.7 million in 1994. Since then, employment has increased,
reaching almost 1.9 million in 1997.
 
Currently, the European car industry faces a number of challenges. First, there is the
problem of overcapacity. According to estimates, only 70-75 percent of production
capacity is currently being used (Hancke 1998). Second, western European car producers
as well as individual plants are facing ever-increasing competition from Japanese and
Korean manufacturers locating in Europe, as well as from their own low-cost plants that
have been set up since the 1980s (first in Portugal and Spain, later in eastern Europe).
Also, more job cuts are likely as the industry prepares for all-out competition with the
expiration in 2000 of voluntary quotas that were limiting Japanese exports to Europe.
Analysts argue that European car makers need to become more cost-efficient while
producing models faster. Third, another trend exerts pressure at the local level:
Multinational car companies increasingly conduct cross-border quality, productivity, and
performance comparisons between their different production locations and allocate
investment (and thus employment) to those plants in the group that meet certain required
standards or that win intracompany competition for production and investment. Those not
meeting the standards face considerable difficulty in attracting investment within the
concern, which may finally endanger the existence of the respective production location.
Marginson and Schulten (1999) report that BMW/Rover, Ford, General Motors, Peugeot,
Renault and Volkswagen use such performance comparisons regularly. Fourth, the diffusion
of lean production across car plants in the European Union puts additional pressure on
employment relations to become more flexible (Kochan and Lansbury 1997; Kochan,
Lansbury, and MacDuffie 1997). In the media, the inter- and intracompany competition in
Europe is often referred to as the "European car wars".
 
All this has serious implications for the workforce. For the late 1980s and early 1990s,
Mueller and Purcell (1992) report that, in the context of the internationalization and cross-
border integration of European car manufacturing, manufacturers with international and
integrated operations have increasingly used threats - namely to withhold investment - to
achieve their aims. This puts pressure on local management to meet certain standards in
internal benchmarking procedures or win intracompany competition in order to get
investment allocated from the headquarters. In turn, this pressures the local bargaining
parties in collective bargaining. In the second half of the 1980s, this led to changes of
working practices by subsequent agreements at several European General Motor
subsidiaries (Mueller and Purcell 1992).
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The severe crisis of 1993 forced most large car producers to react immediately. Many
companies applied measures such as working time reduction and flexibilization, wage
freezes, production restructuring, the development of new models, and the introduction of
Total Quality Management. Machine running time and working time allocation were linked
more closely to product demand. Most companies introduced flexible working time
arrangements and group work. In the following, selected examples of company-level
restructuring activities will be given.
 
 
3.2 Fiat
 
Italy. In 1993, the Fiat Auto group - in agreement with the sectoral trade unions - started a
restructuring programme that involved a large-scale "outplacement" of excess Fiat Auto
workers to other companies. By 1997 a total of 9,000 workers had either been redeployed
within the Fiat group or "outplaced" to other companies outside the group.
 
In 1994, a collective agreement at Fiat Arese (former Alfa-Romeo) included a combination
of provisions for early retirements, job security, and outplacement, and aimed to reduce
staff from 9,000 workers to 4,000 by June 1998. The outplacement was intended to take
place through the sale of the property abandoned by Fiat: companies were given the
possibility to acquire premises under very advantageous conditions if they committed
themselves to hire workers dismissed by Fiat, with the number hired proportional to the
area they bought (Pedersini and Trentini 1997).
 
In April 1999, the metal trade unions and the management of Fiat Auto agreed on the
transfer of more than 2,000 workers from the Mirafiori and Rivalta plants to Comau
Service, a maintenance company controlled by Fiat. In return, Fiat would hire 350 workers
in its bodywork operation at Mirafiori and at the Melfi plant (Potenza) on the basis of work
or training contracts with a duration of 24 months, plus 50 temporary agency workers at
the Melfi plant. This was the first time that Fiat had used, in agreement with the trade
unions, a significant number of temporary agency workers. The new recruitment met the
demands of the Fiat's Rsu employee representative bodies, which had arisen as the result of
a personnel shortage and continuing overtime hours of bodywork employees (EIROnline
IT9904109N).
 
 
3.3 Ford
 
Belgium. In September 1998, Ford announced the reorganization of its plant in Genk,
which implied job cuts of about 25 percent of the workforce within the next two years.
Management targeted a 7 percent reduction of fixed costs in exchange for production
guarantees. Management and unions started negotiations on job losses and work
reorganization immediately. As a result, the company was willing to invest in "humane
forms of restructuring", promising to invest BEF 5 billion in an industrial park that would
attract supplier companies. New employment could thus potentially compensate for the
losses at Ford Genk itself. Work reorganization and redistribution were additional methods
under discussion (EIROnline BE9809244N).
 
Germany. Ford Germany has a long tradition of agreements to secure production locations
(Standortsicherungsvereinbarungen). In 1985, an agreement on restructuring, which
included the reduction of payment above collectively agreed wage levels, was concluded in
exchange for the company's commitment to retain the product development center in
Cologne. The next such agreement on investment in exchange for personnel cost
reductions was forged in 1994. In late 1996, the Ford Motor Company demanded cost
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reduction in Europe. In April 1997, the management board at Ford Germany and the
company works council signed a works agreement to secure investment. In the agreement,
Ford management promised new investments at the five German Ford plants in the next
few years. In return, the company works council agreed to a reduction of "payments above
contract wages", a reduction of the previously high bonuses for late and night work to the
collectively-agreed rate, and a working time corridor of 70 hours including Saturday work.
The company announced that the new works agreement will bring cost savings amounting
to USD 120 Million per year and committed itself to investment at the German production
locations. The chairperson of the company works council declared that the new agreement
will secure jobs at Ford Germany for the next 10 to 15 years (EIROnline DE9704209N).
 
Spain. In 1998, for the first time in the factory's 22-year history, a new works agreement
had not been signed at Ford's Almussafes plant in Valencia by October. Management had
required the unconditional acceptance of an obligatory increase in working hours for all
workers by working in collective breaks and on an additional 10 Saturdays per year in
order to increase production. These demands were rejected by the workers' committee,
which stated that the increase in production should be covered by job creation and
employment stabilization. The union's demands were shorter working hours (a 35-hour
week), the conversion of temporary contracts into permanent contracts, and the early
retirement of workers with compulsory replacement, in addition to pay increases and
promotion for certain groups of workers. After industrial disputes, inter-union
disagreements and rivalries, mediation by the government, as well as threats by
management of dismissals, plant closure, and transfer of production to plants in other
countries, the parties reached a draft agreement. The three-year agreement contained
moderate pay increases, the backdating of the production bonus, the introduction of the
36.5-hour working week in 2001, and the integration of temporary workers into the core
workforce as the situation returns to normal and production increases. The agreement also
specifies that voluntary early retirement will cover all workers over the age of 58.
Furthermore, the apprentices' school will take on 50 children of employees every year. In
exchange, the unions accepted the scheduling of six working Saturdays over the rest of the
year, in addition to six working Sundays on a voluntary basis. As a result of the dispute, the
production of Focus units was transferred to the Saarlouis plant in Germany (EIROnline
ES9810287N; EIROnline ES9811288F).
 
United Kingdom. In January 1997, the Ford Motor Company announced that it was cutting
1,300 jobs at its Halewood plant (UK). This was after some speculation that Ford wanted
to install new and more efficient working practices and that it would threaten to build a
new-generation Escort model elsewhere or close the plant altogether if trade unions did not
agree to concessions. The company then confirmed that production of the new model
would not include Halewood but would be located instead at Saarlouis (Germany) and
Valencia (Spain). Furthermore Halewood would also immediately reduce its shift pattern to
one shift per day. Management stated that redundancies would be imminent if support for
the Multi-Activity Vehicle project (MAV) by government and unions was not forthcoming.
In April 1997, a GBP 15 million package of government support was announced for the
Halewood plant, conditional upon Halewood achieving significant productivity
improvements. A few days earlier, unions agreed to halt a ballot for industrial action,
pending further talks, after the company gave assurances of continued production at
Halewood and also reduced the job losses to 980 voluntary redundancies, on the condition
that the unions would agree to further productivity-enhancing measures. In January 1998,
Ford committed itself to invest at Halewood (EIROnline UK9702101F, EIROnline
UK9704124N).
 
Jaguar (UK). In 1989 Jaguar was taken over by Ford, which provided the investment to
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make changes in the organization of work and to offer large pay increases in order to
facilitate acceptance of the change. However, the takeover also raised the threat of
sourcing production elsewhere in the Ford group. After both redundancies and various
quality improvement initiatives, a job security agreement (JSA) was concluded in 1994 at
the Jaguar car company. The JSA introduced wide-ranging flexibility in terms of working
time and the workforce by reducing demarcations between jobs, by increasing craft
multiskilling and the use of temporary workers, and by expanding teamwork (EIROnline
UK9810153F).
 
In Table 1 a selection of the employment oriented agreements at the European subsidiaries
of the Ford Motor Company is summarized according to the three categories background,
contents and consequences of the agreements.
 
 
Table 1: Bargaining on employment at the Ford Motor Company
 Background Agreement Consequences
Jaguar West
Midlands (UK) 1994
Takeover by
Ford -
investments
and changes in
work practices,
danger of
relocation of
production to
other plants
within the Ford
company
Labour
flexibility:
abolition of job
demarcations,
introduction of
multi-skilling
and team work,
increase in
temporary
employment
Working time
flexibility
Job security
Ford Halewood (UK)
1996-1998
1996:
Management
demands new
working
practices =>
otherwise:
production of
the new Escort
model in
Saarlouis (Ger)
and Valencia
(Sp); 1/1997:
no agreement
=> Ford
announces:
1300
redundancies,
one-shift
production,
Escort to be
produced in
Saarlouis and
Valencia;
Productivity
enhancing
measures
Reduction of
redundancies
to 980
Announced
strikes
cancelled
January 1998:
Ford promises
to invest more
than 400
million pounds;
UK
Government
adds 40-50
million pounds
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4/1997: British
government
promises
subsidies
Ford Germany 1997 Late 1996:
Ford demands
cost reductions
in Europe
Reduction in
"payments
above the
contract wage"
for 1997 and
1998
Working time
corridor of 70
hours
Reduction of
bonus for late
and night shifts
Investment in
production
location in
Cologne,
Düren, Berlin,
Wülfrath and
Saarlouis; cost
savings of 120
million US
dollars
Genk (B) 1998 Management
target: 7
percent
reduction of
fixed costs in
exchange for
maintenance of
production =>
Announcement
of up to 3000
job reductions
by 1999
Negotiations
on the number
of job losses,
measures to
prevent
"uncushioned
redundancies",
work
reorganization
and
redistribution
Company
commitment to
invest in
"humane forms
of
restructuring".
Ford promised
to invest 5
billion Belgian
francs in an
industry park
that would
attract supplier
companies
Almusafes (Sp) 1998 Management
demands
production
increase =>
industrial
disputes,
inter-union
rivalries,
government
mediation,
threats of
dismissals,
plant closure
and transfer of
production to
plants in other
countries
Moderate wage
increases until
2000
The production
bonus was
backdated
Extension of
Saturday work
Apprentices'
school
Reduction of
work week in
2001
Early
retirement
No
redundancies
Transformation
of temporary
into permanent
contracts
Production of
Focus units
transferred to
Saarlouis
(Germany)
 
MPIfG Working Paper 00/2, Stefan Zagelmeyer: Brothers in Arms in the... http://www.mpifg.de/pu/workpap/wp00-2/wp00-2.html
10 von 26 12.07.2011 11:26
 3.4 General Motors
 
Belgium. In October 1997, following the decision by the headquarters in Zurich to cut
production costs and production capacity, Opel Belgium announced a new reduction of the
workforce at its plant in Antwerp by up to 25 percent. The reduction in capacity was to be
carried out partly through ending production of the Vectra model in Antwerp, which would
then be produced only in Rüsselsheim (Germany) and Luton (UK). For Opel Antwerp,
which had suffered from poor profits, this meant the second large-scale reorganization
since 1992, when labour cutbacks had been implemented mainly through a system of early
retirement. The 1997 draft agreement contained the following: a job security clause valid
until 2002; a corresponding investment program as a "guarantee plan"; limited wage
increases and a wage-indexation guarantee; an early retirement scheme from the age of 52
(which was to be supported by the Minister of Employment) and greater flexibility in the
deployment of employees, with greater dependence on demand; the abolition of the annual
holiday closure; and restrictions on outsourcing. The core of the draft agreement included
two proposals for a new form of work organization, and workers could choose between
either a three-shift or two-shift system in a referendum. For the employees, the three-shift
system involved one additional working hour per week for the same wage and 1,600 job
losses. This was the proposal favored by the trade unions. The other proposal involved a
two-shift system within a four-day week, involving a cut in wages between 10 percent and
20 percent for employees, but only 993 job losses. In the referendum, with a high turnout
of 90 percent of all staff, the draft agreement was accepted by 59.9 percent of workers and
62 percent of the management staff. Approximately 60 percent of employees chose the
three-shift system and thus the maximum retention of current wages (EIROnline
BE9710222N; EIROnline BE9803229F).
 
Germany. On 18 November 1993, a pact on employment and competitiveness was
concluded at Adam Opel AG, a subsidiary company of the General Motors Corporation
(GM). The four-year works agreement on "safeguarding production sites" (Site Pact 1)
contained various provisions to reduce labour costs by employee concessions, i.e. a linkage
between collectively agreed wage increases with cuts in the "Opel wages and salaries"
above the collectively agreed rate in order to reduce the wage drift between branch-level
and company payments, as well as provisions for joint initiatives to improve the
organization of work and production. Negotiations for a new pact started in March 1997.
During the negotiations, Opel management announced that further job guarantees could be
given only in exchange for more substantial cuts in labour costs and a further reduction of
the current wage drift. In January 1998, after the chair of GM Europe had announced
workforce reductions with a possible loss of 9,000-14,000 jobs in Germany alone, German
Opel management and the company works council were ready to sign a second site pact,
which contained management promises of new investments and job security, on the one
hand, and measures to cut labour costs, on the other. The new "Site Pact 2 for the
safeguarding of employment and investment" is valid for the western German Opel
production sites. The agreement is subdivided into eleven parts and includes the following:
the linkage of the payment of the company's additional Christmas bonus to the rate of
absenteeism; negotiations on partial and early retirement as well as the company pension
scheme; the taking on of new vocational trainees; working time flexibility; and a reduction
of overtime bonus. In exchange, management gives concrete promises for new investments
and personnel planning at the different Opel plants. There will be no redundancies for
economic reasons until the end of 2002, 12 months longer than the duration of the works
agreement, or, should the new platform production start later than 31 December 2002, until
the start of production on the new platform. However, management has also announced
that the total Opel workforce will be reduced by up to 4,000 employees by the year 2001
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(Zagelmeyer forthcoming). In the winter of 1999, discussions on a Site Pact 3 started, with
the works council offering to introduce entrance wages for new hires at 30 percent less
than the standard rates (Frankfurter Neue Presse, 7 Dec. 1999).
 
Vauxhall (UK). In April 1998, workers at the Luton and Ellesmere Port plants of motor
manufacturer Vauxhall, which is part of the General Motors group, voted to accept a
three-year pay deal that provided for a 3.5 percent wage increase in 1998, a 3 percent
increase in 1999 and a rise in line with inflation in 2000. If the exchange rate of the pound
has fallen below DEM 2.70 at the end of these three years, workers will enjoy an extra 0.5
percent rise and productivity-enhancing changes. Vauxhall, which now says that its exports
are suffering from the current strong pound, had warned that the future of its operations in
Britain depended on acceptance of the package. General Motors had promised to
manufacture the new Vectra model in Luton and invest more than GBP 200 million in the
plant, but only if the deal was accepted (EIROnline UK9805127N).
 
 
3.5 Mercedes Benz (Daimler Chrysler)
 
Germany. In February 1997, a company-wide employment pact (Beschäftigungspakt) was
signed at the automobile manufacturer Mercedes Benz. A whole package of instruments
was compiled to boost competitiveness and save the jobs of the 134,000 employees
working for Mercedes Benz in Germany. The first cornerstone of the package involved
local establishment works agreements on investment, product lines, working time
flexibility, sick leave and the limitation of pay increases. The second cornerstone was
represented by a company-wide works agreement between the management board and the
company works council. According to this agreement, which is valid until 31 December
2000, pay increases are no longer calculated on the base of the actual effective wage level,
but on the base of the (lower) wages agreed upon in collective agreements. Furthermore,
extra payments for shiftwork and Saturday work have been abolished. In return, Mercedes
Benz will avoid redundancies and offer jobs to all vocational trainees, around 2,000 each
year. Furthermore, both sides will negotiate a new pay system (EIROnline DE9703105N).
 
Spain. In 1997, a collective agreement for Mercedes Benz's Spanish operations included
the creation of a pool of working hours through which the company management will be
able to add or subtract five days per worker a year, the conversion of temporary contracts
into permanent ones, and the introduction of a retirement procedure. The intention of the
agreement was to achieve greater flexibility in the use of labour and to avoid redundancies
(EIROnline ES9711232N).
 
 
3.6 PSA Peugeot-Citroën
 
France. In June 1997, management at PSA Peugeot-Citroën announced a new
reorganization and redundancy program for 1997-98, which included almost 3,000 job cuts
to be achieved mainly by early retirements within the framework of the National
Employment Fund program, by measures of worker redeployment, and by contract
modifications from full-time to part-time work. The unions were opposed to this new
program, which makes no provision for compensatory creation of jobs for young people.
CGT demanded joint negotiations on a sector-wide employment plan for the car industry
between the government, unions and manufacturers and put forward three proposals: the
lowering of the retirement age, a reduction in working time, and pay increases (EIROnline
FR9706151N). Almost two years later, in February 1999, five trade unions (except CGT)
and management signed a draft agreement on the reduction of working time. The deal is in
response to the 1998 "Aubry Law" introducing the 35-hour work week and includes the
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following: the exclusion of hitherto included break time in calculating working hours, the
flexibilization of working time (annualized working hours, "time savings accounts" of up to
three years, work organization in three-, four-, five- or six-day weeks according to local
agreements); a FRF 500 bonus and two extra days off for manual workers; and choice for
employees between a pay bonus or extra time off in compensation for Saturday work. In
exchange, an employment plan was set up. Over a five-year period, management foresees
the retirement of 12,500 employees and the recruitment of 8,700 new staff - 4,200 to
compensate for early retirements, 3,000 created by the reduction of working time, and
1,500 linked to increased production. State funding for early retirement, which may affect
the entire motor manufacturing industry, is conditional on the implementation of the
35-hour work week and the recruitment of young people (EIROnline FR9902157N).
 
 
3.7 Renault
 
Belgium. On 27 February 1997, the chair and managing director of the French car
manufacturer Renault, Louis Schweitzer, announced the planned closure by July 1997 of
the group's sole Belgian plant in Vilvorde with a workforce of 3,100. He justified that
decision, which was presented as irrevocable, by a continuing decline in the profitability of
the group and also by the need for the redistribution of production among the remaining
plants, which would also lead to the cutting of 2,800 jobs in France. The news of the
closure of the Belgian subsidiary was associated with the French government's refusal to
grant early retirement at 51 to 40,000 employees, a measure requested jointly by Renault
and Peugeot-Citroën in exchange for taking on 15,000 young people. Renault had been
"downsizing" for around 15 years and had thereby cut its workforce by 50 percent. Renault
manufactured cars in around 30 factories in five European countries: France, Spain,
Portugal, Belgium and Slovenia. The Belgian plant was set up in 1925 and modernized in
the years before 1997; it accounted for only 2 percent of the group's workforce and
manufactured the Clio and the Mégane, both of which were also assembled in other plants.
Although there was an option that the factory in Slovenia would be closed, the Vilvorde
plant was chosen because labour costs were 30 percent higher than at the French plants.
Despite attempts to modernize, these costs had not been offset by an increase in
productivity. Reactions by politicians, the public and trade unions were rather negative.
Among others, the Belgian, Spanish, and French unions staged joint demonstrations and a
one-hour strike on 7 March in all European Renault factories (EIROnline FR9703122F).
 
France. In April 1999, Renault and five trade unions (CFDT, CFTC, CFE-CGC, CGT-FO
and CSl-Sir) signed an agreement which provides for reductions and flexibility of working
time (e.g. working time accounts), the exclusion of previously included break time in
calculating working hours, maintenance of current pay levels, as well as for the early
retirement of 10,500 employees. As regards employment, the agreement provides for 6,000
new employees over five years, but does not reverse the decline in the size of the
workforce, which will continue to fall at an average annual rate of around 5 percent
(EIROnline FR9904175N).
 
Portugal. In 1996, Renault had three facilities in Portugal: the assembly plant in Setúbal,
the engine manufacturing plant in Cacia, and the administrative/sales facility in Lisbon.
Since Renault had long been demonstrating a lack of interest in the Setúbal plant, the
company signed an agreement with the Portuguese government that sold the plant to the
state and thereby enabled 600 workers to keep their jobs. In 1997, the Cacia plant changed
its manufacturing line and no longer produced engines. The changeover resulted in the
temporary loss of 220 jobs. In an agreement signed by the Portuguese government and
Renault, the company formally agreed in 1996 to reinstate the previous level of
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employment. The company claims that the Cacia plant, which switched to manufacturing
gearboxes, is now competitive (EIROnline PT9711148F).
 
 
3.8 Rover (BMW)
 
Rover (UK). The motor manufacturer Rover has a relatively long tradition of job security
agreements. The "New Deal" of 1992 represents the culmination of a series of
productivity-enhancing initiatives such as the introduction of "total quality management" in
the late 1980s. With the takeover of Rover by BMW in 1994, the latter began to link
investment commitments between its plants - and ultimately the Rover employment
guarantee - to employee concessions (EIROnline UK9810153F). In 1997, investment in the
Longbridge production plant and hence its future were linked to collectively agreed upon
changes in work practices that implemented more flexibility in order to increase
productivity (EIROnline UK9704124N). In December 1998, a deal at Rover included
working time reduction and flexibilization (annualized working time accounts, extension of
Saturday work), the elimination of premium payments for overtime and Saturday work,
and 2,500 job losses as the price for new investment and keeping open the plant. BMW
management had maintained that a 30 percent productivity gap existed between the
Longbridge plant and the German BMW plants. According to company estimates, the
agreement will lead to cost savings of around GBP 150 million a year. Workforce reduction
will be achieved through "natural wastage" and voluntary, rather than compulsory,
redundancies (EIROnline UK9812168N). In early 1999, BMW applied to the UK
government for aid towards an overall GBP 1.7 billion investment at Longbridge for the
production of a new medium-sized model. During the course of the negotiations between
BMW and the UK's Department of Trade and Industry, BMW announced that Rover had
suffered a heavy loss in 1998 and that BMW was exploring the possibility of building the
projected new medium-sized car in Hungary as an alternative to investing in Longbridge.
An agreement between BMW and the UK government was finally reached on 31 March
1999, securing a total of 9,000 jobs at Rover's Longbridge plant. In June 1999, details of
the deal were announced. The aid package included state subsidies amounting to GBP 152
million, which are linked to the achievement of productivity guarantees by the company.
When the aid package was confirmed, BMW announced that it would be investing GBP
3.3 billion in its Rover subsidiary by 2005. However, by the time of writing (January 2000),
the deal had not received the required approval from European Commission authorities
responsible for monitoring state aid (EIROnline UK9904100N, EIRONline UK9906112N).
 
 
3.9 Volkswagen
 
Belgium. At Volkswagen's Forest factory, a company agreement was concluded in
September 1997 that aimed to preserve jobs and possibly create new ones. The agreement
provided for a staggered reduction of weekly working hours with partial wage
compensation, the replacement of collective annual holidays with plant closure for
individual holidays, which will make it possible for the plant to run at maximum capacity,
and an extension of Saturday work. This agreement meant that management could extend
the period of machinery utilization and so increase production without new investment.
According to management statements, the flexibility, productivity and cost-reduction
aspects of the agreement could satisfy the demands of the group's world management in
Wolfsburg (Germany) for productivity. Before the agreement, there had been 1,000 people
too many at Forest. Management had the options of making the same number of cars with
a reduced workforce, or of making more cars with the same number of people. Annual
production was to rise from 200,000 to 240,000 units. Although the agreement contained
no such formal commitment, the recruitment of 400 to 600 workers on supply or
MPIfG Working Paper 00/2, Stefan Zagelmeyer: Brothers in Arms in the... http://www.mpifg.de/pu/workpap/wp00-2/wp00-2.html
14 von 26 12.07.2011 11:26
temporary-work contracts was likely. The deal guaranteed employment until 1999 and
would save the 700 to 800 jobs under threat from the assembly of a new model in the
plant. (EIROnline BE9709116N; EIROnline BE9808152F). In July 1998, a new collective
agreement was concluded in order to meet the production quota set by central management
in Wolfsburg. The agreement introduced regular shift work on the weekends in the
bodywork and painting workshops in return for a fixed contract for 1,300 previously
temporary employees (EIROnline BE9808241N).
 
Germany. In 1993, Volkswagen experienced a dramatic decline in automobile purchases,
threatening to lead to mass redundancies. In December 1993, VW and the metal workers'
trade union IG Metall struck a "Collective Agreement to Secure Production Locations and
Employment" (Tarifvertrag zur Sicherung der Standorte und der Beschäftigung der
Arbeitnehmerinnen und Arbeitnehmer bei der Volkswagen AG). The most important
provisions of the two-year agreement were a no-redundancy clause and the introduction of
the four-day work week of 28.8 weekly working hours instead of 36 hours. The
corresponding initial reduction of monthly income was compensated by a whole package
of measures, e.g. the increase of monthly wages, the redistribution of the annual bonus and
holiday pay to the monthly wage, and additional VW contributions. This allowed the
employees to maintain their previous monthly wage. In total, weekly working hours were
reduced by 20 percent, the average gross income by 16 percent. The measures improved
the cost situation of Volkswagen and avoided the dismissal of 30,000 employees. The
agreement was renewed, with minor modifications, in 1995 and 1997. In January 1999,
Volkswagen announced that production at its Wolfsburg production site would return to the
"classic" three-shift model and thus put an end to the 150 different working time models
that were associated with the 1994 shift model and resulted in a number of social problems.
Volkswagen will profit from the three-shift system, since it extends production capacities
and allows for flexible organization of working time distributed over the week according to
demand fluctuations. Furthermore, the company expects increases in productivity and
quality (Zagelmeyer and Schulten 1997; EIROnline DE9707221F; EIROnline
DE9903102N).
 
Audi (Germany). In December 1997, management and the company works council at the
car producer Audi agreed to the continuation of the 1996 works agreement entitled "Audi
for work and maintenance of the production location" (Audi für Arbeit und
Standortsicherung) until 31 December 2001. This agreement includes a no-redundancies
clause, the maintenance of the number of vocational trainees, the hiring of all vocational
trainees who successfully finish their apprenticeship, advanced training to enhance job
security, and the further improvement of working time flexibility through new provisions
affecting working time and shift schedules (EIROnline DE9801144F).
 
SEAT (Spain). In November 1998, an agreement was signed between the trade unions and
the management of the SEAT car factory in Martorell, which involved increasing
production and introducing more flexible working hours in exchange for employment
stability and job creation. Management agreed to convert 600 temporary workers recruited
two years ago into permanent workers, recruit 350 new workers, recruit another 100
temporary workers - students - on a part-time basis to cover weekends and holidays, and
set up two commissions to analyse the feasibility of an early retirement plan and an
occupational regrading plan. In return, the unions agreed to increase the holiday period by
one month, from July to September, with the company paying ESP 6,000 more per day to
workers who take their holidays outside the normal holiday period; to increase shifts on
Saturdays; to work more days per year; not to compensate accumulated hours worked the
previous year and continue to work 80 hours of overtime per worker; and to reduce by 15
percent the wages of new recruits classified as "specialists" in exchange for a reduction in
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the period of service necessary to enter a higher classification (from three to two years).
The management of the SEAT Martorell factory wanted to propose the plant as the best
location for the production of a new SEAT model. In order to obtain the approval of
Volkswagen, SEAT's parent company, management claimed that it was "vital" to reach a
pact with the trade unions to guarantee the necessary increase in production. Since the
factory was working at full capacity, the solution proposed by the company was to increase
the use of the plant by greater flexibility in working hours (EIROnline ES9811288N).
 
 
3.10 Volvo
 
Sweden. In November 1998, Volvo announced that it intended to make 5,300 workers
redundant worldwide by mid-1999, including 2,600 in Sweden and 1,100 in other
European countries. Although no information was published on how the cutbacks would be
implemented, management promised that they would be carried through "in a socially
responsible and dignified manner and in full agreement with the trade unions". In early
December 1998, Volvo Construction Equipment informed its employees at the excavator
factory in Eslöv that the entire factory would be shut down and its production transferred
to Konz (Germany). Some days later, Volvo Cars and Volvo Trucks in Gothenburg
announced that 722 white-collar workers would be made redundant. On 14 December, 295
employees at Volvo Cars in Olofström were given notice of redundancy. Negotiations
started in all these locations. The trade union doubted whether the management would
proceed with all these cutbacks, referring to the large amount of overtime being worked in
Volvo Cars and Volvo Trucks (EIROnline SE9812133N).
 
 
4 Collective agreements on employment: Analysis and implications
 
The adaptation process of employment relations in the European car industry to increasing
competition within and across the multinational companies, new approaches to organizing
production such as "production", and the crisis of the early 1990s, have led to the
emergence and spreading of a certain form of collective bargaining that focusses on
maintaining employment and increasing competitiveness. Employee representatives, either
from trade unions or workplace representational bodies, have thus become involved in the
restructuring activities and, to a large extent, strategic management of virtually all major
European automobile companies. However, the form, contents, extent, scope, and
consequences of these agreements have differed from case to case and company to
company.
 
Such company-level employment pacts and their broad distribution across the European
car industry may have far-reaching implications for national industrial relations systems
and European industrial relations. In the following, I will analyse and discuss the
emergence of employment pacts, their contents and character, the implications for
multilevel systems of employee representation, as well as the roles of the European works
councils and the state. The paper also discusses whether the employment agreements in the
European car industry represent examples of convergence in European industrial relations.
Although the following section will mainly take a regime competition perspective, the
paper will finally return to the employment policy perspective and discuss briefly the
effects of employment pacts on employment.
 
 
4.1 The emergence of bargaining on employment
 
The initiative to restructure the companies, to reduce costs or enhance productivity comes
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from management, either (a) as reactions to acute crisis (such as breakdown in demand for
the company's products, as in the case of the 1993 pact at Volkswagen), (b) in order to
prepare for anticipated restructuring activities, or (c) in order to increase the
competitiveness of the plant in the intraconcern competition for investment. Although the
very existence of agreements on employment, income security, or protection of employees
against the adverse effects of rationalization may be traced back to the 1960s, the extent to
which such agreements appear at different plants within MNCs is relatively new.
 
Whether or not it actually comes to bargaining on employment seems to be largely
dependent on two factors, namely the scope management permits and the power of
workforce representatives to force management to negotiate. The scope for bargaining
seems to have been zero in the cases of the Renault Vilvorde plant and Volvo. In contrast
to the rather unfortunate announcement of the closure of the Renault plant and its
conflictual consequences in which management refused to make any concessions to the
employees, the Volvo management promised to carry out the redundancies in a socially
acceptable way, without any adversarial union reactions. This points to the argument that
labour relations style and atmosphere do matter.
 
When it comes to bargaining on employment, the workforce representatives, either local
unions or works councils, reacted, albeit in different ways, to the proposals and demands of
management. Even if not explicitly, in most cases management was using a carrot-
and-stick strategy, offering investments only against concessions by the employee
representatives or threatening to close the plant or move production to subsidiaries in other
European countries. High levels of unemployment, the crisis of the early 1990s, the
resulting reduction in personnel as well as the potential loss of competitiveness within the
concern associated with plant closure or the denial of future investment by headquarters
limited the scope of action of employee representatives at the company level substantially,
as employment security - especially if one considers the generally poor labour market
situation - became top priority of the workforce. To a large extent, this explains the
concessions made by local employee representatives.
 
At this point, an issue of further research is the question as to whether employment pacts
result from management's attitude towards industrial relations, trade unions and collective
bargaining, or whether they result from strong institutional structures in industrial relations
such as high union density and explicit legal stipulations and regulations that provide the
framework for company-level restructuring.
 
 
4.2 The contents of the employment pacts
 
The resulting collective agreements on employment include guarantees of employment and
job security, in some cases even on investment and production locations by the employer.
In exchange, unions or works councils agreed to make working time more flexible, reduce
total labour costs, contribute to a reorganization of work, and to support productivity
increases and competitiveness. With regards to the bargaining issues, measures relating to
working time (reduction and flexibility) and pay were most important in securing
employment. A majority of the agreements included provisions to secure jobs, either
directly or indirectly. Fewer agreements also included the hiring of new employees or the
transformation of temporary jobs into permanent ones. In a small number of cases,
workforce reductions were agreed upon, mostly within the context of social plans.
Interestingly, a number of agreements include commitments by management to invest
certain amounts of money in specific production locations, especially in the case of the
German agreements where investment commitments are even legally binding.
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 In general, a wide array of different employment-related instruments were used at different
plants and in different countries, mostly as a result of different local conditions and
different national industrial relations systems. The contents of the pacts seem to be heavily
influenced by national social and labour legislation and by national labour market policy,
both of which provide incentives to pursue certain paths of employment adjustment, e.g. in
France and Belgium, where public policy encourages agreement on working time reduction
and reorganization in exchange for financial support.
 
What is often neglected when discussing the character of employment pacts is the role of
company-level employee representatives. In many cases, either local trade unions or
workplace representational bodies have become involved in the restructuring of the
European automobile companies. In many employment pacts, the works councilors
acquired the function of co-management. For example, issues negotiated in the Opel Site
Pact 2 in 1997 amounted to DEM 1.5 billion.
 
 
4.3 The character of bargaining on employment
 
A question that so far has been left unanswered concerns the nature of the collective
bargaining on employment and competitiveness, especially whether it is just another form
of concession bargaining - in other words, old wine in new bottles - or whether it embodies
a distinctively new approach to collective bargaining.
 
The employment agreements in the European car industry have a lot in common with the
"productivity coalitions" (Windolf 1989) of the 1980s or the new American forms of
"social contracts" of the 1990s, which include "quid pro quos between labour and
management as well as shared understandings about the rules of the 'game' " (Walton et al.
1994: xiii) in an era oriented around industrial competitiveness. These new "social
contracts" aim at structuring positive employment relationships by jointly reestablishing
cooperative labour-management relations and thus fostering change (Kochan 1999). Future
research should further elabourate on whether these employment pacts represent cases of
the "efficient bargaining model" of labour economics, where the parallel negotiation of
wages and employment between unions and employer is believed to lead - under certain
circumstances  - to higher levels of employment than would collective bargaining over
wages only (Booth 1995).
 
There are several lines of argument regarding the character of the company-level
employment pacts. The employment pacts in the European car industry clearly fall into the
category defined by Linsenmayer of concession bargaining as "the practice of negotiating
reduced wages and benefits or more flexible work rules to help endangered companies
reduce their labour costs and increase their productivity and competitiveness" (1986: 207)
in return for, among other things, job security. Employers gave employment guarantees
only in exchange for concessions by the trade unions. However, compared to the
"concession bargaining" that the US witnessed in the 1980s (Mitchell 1994; Linsenmayer
1986), the European version of bargaining did not involve any union busting or avoidance
strategies. Also, the negotiation of such pacts seemed on the whole less confrontational and
conflictual. Drawing on the framework of Walton and McKersie (1965), it appears as if the
European type of employment pacts represented a move away from more traditional
distributive bargaining, involving gains for one side and losses for the other determined
solely by the ability to exert bargaining power, to interest-based or integrative bargaining,
in which management and labour both gain when they reach agreements that increase
productivity and organizational performance (win-win bargaining). In contrast to the hard
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bargaining that occurred in the US car industry in the 1980s, the European employment
pacts focus on problem-solving in terms of competitiveness of the plant or the company
(and the associated level and structure of employment) in a long-term relationship
associated with rather high levels of mutual trust. Evidence for the latter may be seen in
the fact that, in a number of cases, pacts on employment and competitiveness have been
concluded not only once, e.g. in a situation of crisis, but repeatedly in order to adapt to
changing circumstances. It may well be that in the course of successful employment pacts,
learning effects, attitudinal structuring, and the building of trust between the parties may
lead to a transformation of labour relations.
 
A further striking contrast to the union's "emphasis of adversarial relations with
management" (Craft, Abboushi and Labovitz 1985) in the American type of concession
bargaining is that - as far as it has been reported - the majority of the employee
representatives involved in negotiating the pacts in the European car industry see the pacts
as an innovative way to achieve a comparative and competitive strategic advantage
vis-à-vis their competitors, be it in relation to external competition with other car
producers or with regard to internal competition with other production locations within the
multinational company, and thus as a strategic device enabling them to secure investment
and existing jobs as well as increase competitiveness in a changing economic environment.
Also, as the results of the works council elections or election procedures for the local trade
union bargaining agents show, the workforce seems to have generally accepted the change
in the role and the involvement of employee representatives in the continuous restructuring
and optimization process of the plant. Nevertheless, there are small minority groups of
employees and some trade union officials who fundamentally oppose this shift in direction
and criticize the pacts as blackmail of the workforce's bargaining agents by management or
as accommodatingly corporatist arrangements. These groups see the pacts as opening the
doors to downward spirals in working conditions and competitive under-cutting of
agreements. They fear that, as competition between the plants within one multinational
company continues, concessions at one plant can be surpassed by others, with each
agreement putting pressure on the other plants, setting the agenda for collective bargaining,
and forcing other plants to adopt similar measures or to even surpass these. As in the case
of MNCs, the potential for management to play units off against one another is clearly
there. This criticism is not without substance and should certainly not be omitted from any
discussion on employment pacts. However, this argument highly reflects a (comparative)
static view of labour relations, and - whether deliberately or not - fades out the dynamic
dimension of competition in contemporary capitalism and the role of pacts on employment
and competitiveness played therein. From this angle, the formation of management-labour
coalitions at the company or plant level and the resulting institutional innovations called
pacts on employment and competitiveness may be regarded as strategic labour relations
tools in order to gain a comparative advantage in the dynamics of regime competition in
the European car industry. To sum up: Management and labour have become brothers in
arms in the European car wars.
 
 
4.4 Employment pacts and multilevel employee representation
 
The pacts also mean a challenge for the relationship between employee representative
bodies at different levels. In cases where agreements on employment were concluded by
works councils, the relationship and balance of power between the works councils and the
trade union(s) may have been affected. First, during the negotiating process, the role of
employers' associations and the trade unions was rather limited. The employers' association
was rarely involved. And the role of the national trade union(s) was in most cases limited
to technical and legal support. In the case of Opel (Germany)[2], intraorganizational
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bargaining took place between higher level management and the management's bargaining
agents as well as between the negotiating works council agents and the workforce. Second,
when asked about the interest and preferences of the works council as compared to the
national union, company management frequently replied that works councilors are on the
payroll of the company and not of the trade union. And employee representatives of the
local workforce answered that they would, of course, primarily act to further the interest of
the local workforce and not follow blindly the orders of union functionaries. Third, most
employment pacts include a comprehensive package of agreed measures, which previously
may have been regulated at more centralized bargaining. This implies a decentralization of
collective bargaining and the associated loss in importance of the national union. Fourth,
some plant agreements have stipulations that make reference to specific provisions in
sectoral or multisectoral agreements, but the intent of such stipulations runs counter to that
of the sectoral agreement to which they refer, thereby limiting the impact of multi-
employer colletive bargaining. A case in point are clauses in company-level agreements
that link wage rises included in the collective wage agreement at the sectoral level to
reductions in "pay above contract wages" at the plant or company level. Since the 1980s,
for example, Opel Germany and Ford Germany have reduced the wage gap between
effective earnings and collectively agreed earnings (agreed in industry-level agreements)
from on average far more than 30 percent to currently about 15 percent. It will be
interesting to see what happens to industry-level bargaining when the wage gap closes
further as a result of future employment pacts. Another argument emphasizes that
successful local level pacts may act as legitimation for the employee representatives and
thus for the articulation between actors at different levels.
 
 
4.5 The role of the European works councils
 
Another interesting point concerns the role of the European works councils (EWCs) in the
conclusion of the employment pacts. EWCs were introduced as a means for workforce
representation to increase the control over international restructuring processes of
multinational companies. Trade unionists thought that EWCs could and would contribute
to some kind of transnational coordination of collective bargaining units, which, in the
longer run, would lead to transnational bargaining units. The hope was that EWCs would
contribute to agreements on minimum standards to be adopted by all plant delegations in
their negotiations, in order to prevent competitive underbidding. However, qualitative
research by Hancke (1999) on the role of the EWCs in the conclusion of these
employment pacts reveals the following: First, local unionists use EWCs as an instrument
for obtaining information and understanding labour relations in other countries in order to
further employment at their home plant. Thus EWCs are not used as a means of
cooperation and coordination of union action at different plants, but instead play a major
part in the competitive game. Second, management had used EWCs as a forum to explain
corporate restructuring processes and get support. Hancke (1999: 3) concludes that EWCs,
"originally conceived as instruments to prevent regime competition and against social
dumping, are, because of the way they are used by unions and management, increasingly
becoming vehicles for international labour regime competition".
 
 
4.6 The role of the state
 
What is usually omitted and in some cases not even noticed is the role of the state in the
context of restructuring processes in the European car industry. First, public policy and
regulation towards plant closure may have an impact on "exit costs", i.e. the costs
associated with reducing or closing down operations due to public regulation. In the UK,
Belgium, and Portugal, low exit costs were made responsible for the closure of plants of
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multinational enterprises and the associated job losses. In the cases of Portuguese plants,
government took over the plants from the car companies, thereby saving jobs. Second,
more important seems to be the role of subsidies which gives rise to a phenomenon which
is may be labeled "subsidy shopping". In a number of cases, companies have been shifting
production and thus jobs to countries were they were eligible for EU and/or national and/or
regional subsidies. At least since the Renault case, where Renault closed down its Belgian
Vilvorde plant and increased production in Spain with the assistance of the Spanish
government, the EU Commission has become aware of this problem. It will be interesting
to see how the European Commission rules on the Rover case.
 
 
4.7 Employment pacts: Examples of convergence?
 
The issue whether industrial relations institutions in Europe are converging or diverging in
terms of form and content has been increasingly discussed in recent years (Hansen et al.
1997). Against the common background of increasing competition and the resulting
pressures, naturally the question arises as to whether the company-level employment pacts
in the European car industry are examples of convergence or divergence. The answer to
this question is by no means trivial.
 
In general, the increasing international competition between different potential production
locations creates pressure to achieve whatever type of production and work organization is
needed for market success, i.e. competitiveness. Although collective bargaining
arrangements are very different across countries, the European car industry displays
similar trends of bargaining decentralization down to the company or even the factory level
associated with the transfer of accountability and responsibility for labour costs and
performance. Mueller and Purcell (1992) argue that differences between national patterns
of negotiations in one multinational company may become very small indeed. Although a
number of plants are subject to multi-employer collective agreements, it seems as if the
scope of action has become quite similar with regard to personnel and labour relations
issues at the local level.
 
However, there are also several forces at work that contribute to country- and company-
specific patterns. In general, a wide array of different employment-related instruments
were used in different countries. The contents of employment pacts seem to be heavily
influenced by national industrial relations systems, national social and labour legislation,
and by national labour market policy. Thus, action is clearly influenced by national
institutions.
 
The emergence of company-specific patterns seems to depend largely on the centralization
of labour and personnel policies. For Volkswagen, the agreements at its subsidiary Seat and
at the Belgian plant seem to have been the consequence of directives from the
headquarters in Wolfsburg (Germany), Ford and General Motors pursue relatively
decentralized labour relations policies resulting in different local strategies as long as the
plants reach certain performance standards and meet profit expectations. Volkswagen
appears to pursue a rather inclusive approach, permitting comprehensive bargaining on
working time, pay, employment and smoothing the adjustment process by compensating
employees for concessions, i.e. increases in certain pay components. At Ford and GM, it
appears that management bargains over employment, but is not prepared to provide further
compensation for employee concessions. Table 1 summarizes the background, contents,
and consequences of different employment agreements at European subsidiaries of the
Ford Motor Company. It becomes clear that, despite the differences in national labour
relations institutions in which the management of the plants are embedded, the background
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shows striking similarities in terms of external pressures, the bargaining level involved, and
the contents of the agreements, which aim to reduce costs and/or increase flexibility or
productivity.
 
All in all, in the context of regime competition, the company level employment pacts hint
at a convergence in terms of functional equivalents in the substance and divergence in
terms of form of such agreements, with the latter being still determined by structurally
different national institutions. This supports Marginson and Sisson's (1998) argument that
industrial relations in Europe are characterized by increasing diversification within rather
than between national systems and by a convergence that stems from pressure on
management to adopt "best practice" solutions.
 
 
4.8 The effects of employment pacts on employment
 
Although the main aim of the employment pacts has been to preserve or create jobs as well
as to increase competitiveness, the actual impact and success in terms of effects on
employment cannot be thoroughly and conclusively determined on the basis of information
obtained from the European Industrial Relations Observatory (EIRO). Only in a few cases
have agreements been subject to systematic and thorough evaluation procedures. This may
be due either to the short time since the conclusion of some agreements, lack of sufficient
research, or the signatories' lack of interest in either evaluating their agreements or
publishing the respective information.
 
An overall picture emerges from the available information on how successful the
agreements are at creating and protecting jobs. At the company level, company or works
agreements on employment have included concrete, and in some cases even legally
binding, provisions guaranteeing jobs for a certain period of time or even creating a
specific number of new jobs. However, with few exceptions, company level agreements
have aimed at preserving jobs for the "insiders", thus representing a rather "defensive"
employment policy measure. In many cases, company-level employment pacts seem to
have been the output of joint crisis-management. The employment-related aims of these
company-level agreements were usually achieved, implying that these types of agreements
are able to guarantee employment in the short run. However, in many cases, one cannot get
rid of the impression that employers were using these agreements as a means of achieving
personnel adjustment (in most cases reductions) not through mass redundancies, but in
socially acceptable ways. The impact of agreements on employment above the company
level, i.e. at the national, sectoral or regional level, is even more difficult to evaluate.
Although there is a huge body of theoretical literature on the relationship between
corporatism and economic and social performance (Calmfors 1993; Teulings and Hartog
1998) as well as on social pacts (Traxler 1997), there is still a lack of thorough and
conclusive empirical research evidence on the impact of the employment pacts.
 
One rather general line of argument concerning the possibilities for the social partners to
create jobs by collective bargaining and the resulting collective agreements goes as follows:
When - in a market economy - the parties involved in tripartite or bipartite agreements at
national, regional, and sectoral levels conclude agreements or alliances on employment,
there is no way to directly bind individual employers to certain employment goals. At best,
the social partners can establish a certain framework that might indirectly influence the
employer's attitude towards creating new jobs or giving up plans for redundancies.
However, if management and the representatives of the workforce negotiate over
employment and substantive bargaining issues at the company level, it seems possible that
the agreements on avoiding redundancies or creating jobs can be made to stick.
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 Nevertheless, although employment pacts may increase competitiveness, they should not
be considered as panacea. Reality is more difficult. As the Renault Vilvorde case of 1997
shows, the efficient use of the "just-in-time" system to reach collective agreements on
productivity and flexibility, did not guarantee job security in the long run. The unions had
accepted extensive compromises on those issues at the Renault plant, concessions that
ultimately proved to be useless when in 1997 management announced it would close the
plant (EIROnline FR9703122F).
 
 
5 Conclusion
 
In the 1990s, many European countries witnessed an increase in bargaining on employment
at various levels. The presented cases of company level pacts on employment and
competitiveness in the European car industry show that regime competition within the
European Union (Streeck 1998) not only exists at the national level, affecting national
labour relations systems at macro-level, but also exists at the micro level, especially with
regards to competition between plants within multinational enterprises. The
internationalization of markets and production has increased the pressure for organizational
change and the need to modify long established labour practices. Plants within companies
find themselves in continuous competition for investment, which is essential for their
viability. In order to enhance the competitiveness of either geographically defined regimes
or single enterprises or plants, the labour relations actors are making strategic choices,
which in some cases may also lead to institutional reforms and change. Critics of the
employment pacts regard them as just another form of adversarial concession bargaining.
However, as was argued in this paper, employment pacts at the company level may also be
regarded as new emerging forms of cooperative and consensual labour relations - Streeck
(1998) speaks of a new "peace formula" between capital and labour - which are about
"adjusting the governance of the employment relationship to the imperatives of joint
competitive success" (Streeck 1998: 15). As regards the pacts on employment and
competitiveness, management and labour have departed from their roles as eternal
arch-enemies in the class struggle. Instead, they have become brothers in arms in regime
competition.
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Endnotes
1   This paper is based on "Bargaining on employment in Europe: The example of the
European car industry", which the author will present at the Twelfth World Congress of the
International Industrial Relations Association (IIRA) on "Global Integration and
Challenges for Industrial Relations and Human Resource Management in the Twenty-First
Century", May 29 - June 2, 2000 in Tokyo, Japan. The empirical part of the paper is largely
based on the report "Collective bargaining on employment in the European Union and
Norway" by the author (Zagelmeyer forthcoming) for the "Bargaining on Employment and
Competitiveness" project of the European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and
Working Conditions, Dublin, Ireland (for first results of the project see Sisson et al. 1999
and Sisson and Artiles 1999). I would like to thank Werner Eichhorst, Dona Geyer, Fred
Hoth, Antje Kurdelbusch and Britta Rehder for constructive criticism and invaluable
support.
2   Some of the following arguments are based on interviews Thorsten Schulten and I
conducted with management and works councilors at Opel (Germany) for the "Bargaining
on Employment and Competitiveness" project of the European Foundation for the
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